Table of Authorities
Court cases cited in EWRL evidence base and law & policy entries, organized by court.
United States Supreme Court
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Anderson v. Creighton
483 U.S. 635 (1987)
An officer is entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed the search was lawful "in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed." The Eighth Circuit erred by defining the right at too high a level of generality. The Court vacated the judgment and remanded.
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Ashcroft v. al-Kidd
563 U.S. 731 (2011)
"[A]n objectively reasonable arrest and detention of a material witness pursuant to a validly obtained warrant cannot be challenged as unconstitutional on the basis of allegations that the arresting authority had an improper motive," and in any event Ashcroft did not violate clearly established law. The Ninth Circuit was **reversed** and the case **remanded**; the Court did not reach absolute immunity.
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Barnes v. Felix
605 U.S. 73 (2025)
The moment-of-threat rule improperly narrows the Fourth Amendment inquiry. Courts must consider "all the relevant circumstances, including facts and events leading up to the climactic moment." In a unanimous opinion, the Court vacated the Fifth Circuit's judgment and remanded for the reasonableness of the shooting to be assessed over the longer timeframe.
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Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown
520 U.S. 397 (1997)
Not on this record. Assuming without deciding that a single inadequate-screening decision could ever support municipal liability, the evidence did not show that Burns's use of excessive force was a "plainly obvious consequence" of hiring him, so the claim should not have gone to the jury. In a 5-4 decision, the Fifth Circuit's judgment was vacated and the case remanded.
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Brosseau v. Haugen
543 U.S. 194 (2004) (per curiam)
Expressing no view on whether the Fourth Amendment was violated, the Court held that the law did not clearly establish that Brosseau's conduct was unconstitutional, so she was entitled to qualified immunity. The Ninth Circuit was reversed and the case remanded.
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California v. Ciraolo
476 U.S. 207 (1986)
By a 5–4 vote, the Court held that Ciraolo's expectation that his yard was protected from naked-eye observation from public airspace at 1,000 feet was not one "society is prepared to honor," so no warrant was required. The California Court of Appeal was **reversed**.
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Carey v. Piphus
435 U.S. 247 (1978)
Without proof of actual injury, plaintiffs denied procedural due process may recover only nominal damages "not to exceed one dollar." Mental and emotional distress caused by the denial of due process is compensable, but it must be proved. The Court **reversed** and **remanded**.
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Carpenter v. United States
585 U.S. 296 (2018)
The Government's acquisition of Carpenter's CSLI was a search, and the Government "must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring such records." The Sixth Circuit's judgment was reversed and the case remanded (5–4).
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City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan
575 U.S. 600 (2015)
The Court dismissed the ADA question as improvidently granted. It held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because they violated no clearly established Fourth Amendment right. The Ninth Circuit was reversed in part and the case remanded.
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City of Canton v. Harris
489 U.S. 378 (1989)
Yes, but only where the failure to train amounts to "deliberate indifference" to the rights of persons the police come into contact with, and the training deficiency actually caused the injury. The Court rejected the Sixth Circuit's broader gross-negligence rule, vacated its judgment, and remanded.
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City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik
485 U.S. 112 (1988)
The Eighth Circuit applied an incorrect legal standard. Identifying final policymakers is a question of state law, and a supervisor's unreviewed discretionary decisions do not make that supervisor a municipal policymaker. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded. Justice O'Connor wrote the plurality opinion (four Justices), and Justice Brennan (three Justices) concurred in the judgment.
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City of Tahlequah v. Bond
595 U.S. 9 (2021) (per curiam)
The officers "plainly did not violate any clearly established law" and were entitled to qualified immunity. The Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's judgment without deciding whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred.
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Connick v. Thompson
563 U.S. 51 (2011)
No. Reversed. Failure to train prosecutors on *Brady* does not fall within the narrow "single-incident" liability hypothesized in *City of Canton v. Harris*. Without a pattern of similar violations, Thompson could not prove deliberate indifference, and Connick was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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County of Los Angeles v. Mendez
581 U.S. 420 (2017)
The Fourth Amendment provides no basis for the Ninth Circuit's provocation rule. "A different Fourth Amendment violation cannot transform a later, reasonable use of force into an unreasonable seizure." The judgment was vacated and the case remanded, with instructions to reconsider whether the warrantless entry proximately caused the shooting injuries.
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District of Columbia v. Wesby
583 U.S. 48 (2018)
The officers had probable cause to arrest, and in any event they were entitled to qualified immunity because no settled law showed the arrests were unlawful. The D.C. Circuit's judgment was **reversed** and the case **remanded**.
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Dow Chemical Co. v. United States
476 U.S. 227 (1986)
EPA's use of aerial observation and photography is within its statutory authority. "The taking of aerial photographs of an industrial plant complex from navigable airspace is not a search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment." The Sixth Circuit's judgment was affirmed.
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Farrar v. Hobby
506 U.S. 103 (1992)
A plaintiff who wins nominal damages is a "prevailing party" under § 1988. However, when a plaintiff seeking compensatory damages recovers only nominal damages because he failed to prove an essential element of his claim, "the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all." The Court therefore affirmed the Fifth Circuit's reversal of the fee award.
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Florida v. Riley
488 U.S. 445 (1989)
No. The Court reversed the Florida Supreme Court and held that the helicopter observation did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The judgment rested on a four-Justice plurality opinion by Justice White and Justice O'Connor's concurrence in the judgment.
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Graham v. Connor
490 U.S. 386 (1989)
All claims that law enforcement officers used excessive force, "deadly or not," in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure of a free citizen must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard. The Court **vacated** the Fourth Circuit's judgment and **remanded** for reconsideration under that standard.
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Harlow v. Fitzgerald
457 U.S. 800 (1982)
Presidential aides generally have only qualified immunity, unless an aide shows that a particular function, such as national security or foreign policy, requires absolute immunity. The Court also redefined qualified immunity as an objective test: officials performing discretionary functions are "shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." The judgment was vacated and the case remanded.
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Hope v. Pelzer
536 U.S. 730 (2002)
The Court held that the alleged hitching-post punishment was an "obvious" Eighth Amendment violation and that the guards had fair warning it was unlawful. "Materially similar" precedent is not required, so the guards were not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit was reversed.
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Kingsley v. Hendrickson
576 U.S. 389 (2015)
A pretrial detainee "must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable." The jury instruction was erroneous. The Court **vacated** the judgment and **remanded** for the Seventh Circuit to decide whether the error was harmless.
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Kisela v. Hughes
584 U.S. 100 (2018) (per curiam)
Without deciding whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred ("a proposition that is not at all evident"), the Court held that Kisela was entitled to qualified immunity because no clearly established law prohibited his conduct. The Court reversed and remanded.
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Lombardo v. City of St. Louis
594 U.S. 464 (2021) (per curiam)
The Court granted certiorari, vacated the Eighth Circuit's judgment, and remanded so that the court could conduct an inquiry that "clearly attends to the facts and circumstances." The Court expressed no view on whether the force was excessive or whether the right was clearly established.
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Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.
457 U.S. 922 (1982)
Conduct that meets the Fourteenth Amendment's state-action requirement also meets § 1983's under-color-of-state-law requirement. A private party's joint participation with state officials in seizing disputed property under a state-created attachment scheme makes that party a state actor. Lugar stated a § 1983 claim to the extent he challenged the constitutionality of the Virginia statute, but not to the extent he alleged only misuse or abuse of it. The Court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.
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Malley v. Briggs
475 U.S. 335 (1986)
An officer who applies for an arrest warrant gets only qualified immunity, not absolute immunity. That immunity is lost where "the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable." The First Circuit's judgment was affirmed and the case remanded.
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Memphis Community School District v. Stachura
477 U.S. 299 (1986)
No. Damages based on the abstract value or importance of constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages under § 1983. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial limited to compensatory damages.
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Mitchum v. Foster
407 U.S. 225 (1972)
Section 1983 falls within the "expressly authorized" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, so the district court erred in holding that it was "absolutely without power" to enjoin the pending state proceeding. The judgment was reversed and remanded. (Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate.)
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Monell v. Department of Social Services
436 U.S. 658 (1978)
The Court overruled *Monroe v. Pape* "insofar as it holds that local governments are wholly immune from suit under § 1983." Local governing bodies can be sued directly for damages, declaratory relief, or injunctive relief when an unconstitutional act "implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated," or a governmental "custom." Liability cannot rest on respondeat superior. The judgment was **reversed**.
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Monroe v. Pape
365 U.S. 167 (1961)
The complaint stated a § 1983 claim against the officers. Misuse of power "possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law" is action "under color of" state law, and the federal remedy is "supplementary to the state remedy." The dismissal of the City was affirmed because Congress did not intend municipalities to be "persons" under § 1983, but the judgment was reversed as to the officers.
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Mullenix v. Luna
577 U.S. 7 (2015) (per curiam)
Addressing only qualified immunity, the Court held that existing precedent did not place the unreasonableness of Mullenix's conduct "beyond debate," so he was entitled to qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit's judgment was reversed.
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Oklahoma City v. Tuttle
471 U.S. 808 (1985)
No. Reversed. Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity cannot establish municipal liability unless the incident itself is shown to have been caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy attributable to a municipal policymaker. The instruction allowing the jury to infer such a policy from the single incident was error.
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Owen v. City of Independence
445 U.S. 622 (1980)
No. A municipality has no immunity from § 1983 liability flowing from its constitutional violations and "may not assert the good faith of its officers or agents as a defense." The Eighth Circuit's judgment was reversed (5-4).
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Pearson v. Callahan
555 U.S. 223 (2009)
In a unanimous opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that the *Saucier* sequence "should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement." Lower courts may decide which prong to address first. The officers were entitled to qualified immunity because their entry did not violate clearly established law, and the Tenth Circuit's judgment was reversed.
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Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati
475 U.S. 469 (1986)
Yes. Municipal liability "may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances." Here the County Prosecutor, acting as the county's final decisionmaker, ordered the unconstitutional entry. The Court **reversed** and **remanded**.
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Pierson v. Ray
386 U.S. 547 (1967)
Judges are absolutely immune from § 1983 damages for acts within their judicial jurisdiction. Police officers may assert a defense of good faith and probable cause to a § 1983 arrest claim. The ministers' expectation of arrest did not amount to consent. The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a new trial.
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Pina v. Estate of Dominguez
604 U.S. 1157 (2025), cert. denied
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity. The panel held that the special interrogatory finding and the general excessive force verdict are not irreconcilably inconsistent. At least one scenario reconciles both: a reasonable jury could have found that although Dominguez dropped his hands and leaned forward, he did not appear to be reaching for a weapon at the moment Pina fired, making deadly force constitutionally unjustified. The jury's findings, taken together, established both the constitutional violation and the clearly established nature of the right under existing circuit precedent.
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Plumhoff v. Rickard
572 U.S. 765 (2014)
Appellate jurisdiction was proper. The officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment by using deadly force to end the chase or by the number of shots they fired, and in the alternative they were entitled to qualified immunity because they violated no clearly established law. The Court reversed and remanded.
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Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna
595 U.S. 1 (2021) (per curiam)
Even assuming circuit precedent can clearly establish law for § 1983 purposes, *LaLonde* was materially distinguishable and no Supreme Court decision was sufficiently similar, so Rivas-Villegas was entitled to qualified immunity. The Court granted certiorari and reversed the Ninth Circuit.
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Saucier v. Katz
533 U.S. 194 (2001)
Reversed and remanded. Qualified immunity requires a separate, sequential analysis that does not merge into the excessive-force merits. Saucier was entitled to qualified immunity because no clearly established rule barred the force he used, and the suit should have been dismissed early.
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Scott v. Harris
550 U.S. 372 (2007)
Scott's attempt to terminate the chase by forcing Harris off the road was objectively reasonable, so he did not violate the Fourth Amendment and was entitled to summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit's judgment was reversed (8-1).
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Screws v. United States
325 U.S. 91 (1945)
In a plurality opinion by Justice Douglas, the Court upheld § 20 by reading "willfully" to require a specific intent to deprive a person of a constitutional right made definite by the Constitution or court decisions, and held that the officers acted "under color of" law. Because the jury was not instructed on that specific intent, the convictions were reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
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Smith v. Wade
461 U.S. 30 (1983)
"[A] jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in an action under § 1983 when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others," and this threshold applies even when the standard for compensatory liability is also recklessness. The judgment was **affirmed**.
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Taylor v. Riojas
592 U.S. 7 (2020) (per curiam)
No reasonable correctional officer could have concluded that it was constitutionally permissible to house Taylor in such deplorably unsanitary conditions for so long, so the Fifth Circuit erred in granting qualified immunity. The Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded for further proceedings.
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Tolan v. Cotton
572 U.S. 650 (2014) (per curiam)
Reversed and remanded, per curiam (7–2; Alito and Scalia concurred only in the judgment). The Fifth Circuit failed to adhere to the foundational summary judgment rule requiring that courts view disputed facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. That failure was not harmless: the disputed facts were material to the excessive-force analysis.
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Tennessee v. Garner
471 U.S. 1 (1985)
Deadly force "may not be used unless it is necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others." The Tennessee statute was invalid insofar as it authorized Hymon's shooting. The Sixth Circuit was **affirmed** and the case **remanded** on the city's possible *Monell* liability.
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Torres v. Madrid
592 U.S. 306 (2021)
Yes. "The application of physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain is a seizure even if the person does not submit and is not subdued." The officers seized Torres "for the instant that the bullets struck her." The Court **vacated** and **remanded**, leaving open reasonableness, damages, and qualified immunity.
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United States v. Jones
565 U.S. 400 (2012)
The attachment of a GPS device to a vehicle and its use to monitor movements is a Fourth Amendment search. Because the Government physically intruded on a constitutionally protected "effect" -- the vehicle -- to obtain information, the Fourth Amendment was triggered regardless of whether Jones had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his public movements. The D.C. Circuit's reversal was **affirmed**.
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United States v. Lanier
520 U.S. 259 (1997)
In an opinion by Justice Souter, the Court held that the Sixth Circuit applied the wrong standard. Fair warning under § 242 is the same as the qualified immunity standard: the unlawfulness must be "apparent" "in the light of pre-existing law." The judgment was vacated and the case remanded.
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United States v. Price
383 U.S. 787 (1966)
Yes on both questions. Private persons jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited conduct act "under color" of law, and § 241 covers Fourteenth Amendment rights, including the right not to be deprived of life or liberty without due process. The Court reversed the dismissals and remanded both indictments for trial.
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West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (1988)
Yes. Dr. Atkins's medical treatment of West was state action "fairly attributable to the State," so he acted under color of state law. The Fourth Circuit's judgment was reversed and the case remanded.
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White v. Pauly
580 U.S. 73 (2017) (per curiam)
On the record described by the Court of Appeals, Officer White did not violate clearly established law and was entitled to qualified immunity. The Court **granted certiorari, vacated** the Tenth Circuit's judgment, and **remanded**.
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Williams v. United States
341 U.S. 97 (1951)
Affirmed. Williams acted under color of law, and § 20 was not unconstitutionally vague as applied. Forcibly extracting confessions plainly and willfully deprived the victims of their constitutional right to due process.
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Wood v. Strickland
420 U.S. 308 (1975)
School board members have a qualified good-faith immunity, not an absolute one. They lose it if they "knew or reasonably should have known" their action would violate a student's constitutional rights, or acted "with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury." The Court of Appeals' substantive due process ruling rested on a misreading of the school regulation, so its judgment was **vacated** and the case **remanded**, including for consideration of the procedural due process claim.
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
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Elliott v. Leavitt
99 F.3d 640 (4th Cir. 1996)
The Fourth Circuit held that the officers' use of deadly force "in response to an obvious, serious, and immediate threat to their safety was reasonable under Graham v. Connor." It reversed the denial of summary judgment and remanded with directions to dismiss.
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Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore Police Department
2 F.4th 330 (4th Cir. 2021) (en banc)
The en banc Fourth Circuit held that the appeal was not moot because BPD still held and could access AIR data and reports. It further held that "because the AIR program enables police to deduce from the whole of individuals' movements... accessing its data is a search, and its warrantless operation violates the Fourth Amendment." The denial of a preliminary injunction was reversed and the case remanded.
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Spencer v. Glaser
No. 25-1425, 2026 WL 2235303 (4th Cir. Aug. 4, 2026)
The Fourth Circuit held that the estate failed to plausibly allege a Fourth Amendment violation as to any of the three shots. The state-law claims failed with the federal claims, and dismissal was affirmed.
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Waterman v. Batton
393 F.3d 471 (4th Cir. 2005)
The majority (Wilkins, C.J., joined by Hudson, J.) reversed and remanded. The initial shots were reasonable as a matter of law. The later shots, viewed favorably to the estate, could be found unconstitutional, but that rule was not clearly established in Maryland in November 2000, so the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on both sets of shots.
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
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Hainze v. Richards
207 F.3d 795 (5th Cir. 2000)
No. Affirmed. Title II of the ADA does not apply to an officer's on-the-street responses to reported disturbances or other similar incidents, whether or not those calls involve subjects with mental disabilities, when exigent circumstances require the use of force to protect public safety. The reasonable-modification obligation does not extend to split-second force decisions.
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
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Bruner v. Dunaway
684 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1982)
The Sixth Circuit affirmed in all respects. The new-trial order was not an abuse of discretion because the record supported the finding that some defendants were not present during the beating. The jury could reasonably find that Bates, Taylor and Castellaw used excessive and unreasonable force, and the $100,000 award did not warrant remittitur.
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Estate of Hill v. Miracle
853 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2017)
Reversed and remanded on both claims. Summary judgment was improper on the Fourth Amendment claim because the officers' CIT training was relevant to what a "reasonable officer similarly situated" would have done, creating a genuine factual dispute. On the ADA, the Sixth Circuit rejected the categorical *Hainze* rule and held that ADA applies to police encounters with mentally ill subjects.
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McDowell v. Rogers
863 F.2d 1302 (6th Cir. 1988)
Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to McDowell, a jury could find that Officer Ross's alleged nightstick blows were an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, so the directed verdict for Ross was reversed and that claim was remanded. The judgment for Officers Rogers and Martin was affirmed because their conduct did not deprive McDowell of any constitutional right.
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Phelps v. City of Saginaw
No. 25-2092 (6th Cir. Aug. 13, 2026) (unpublished)
A reasonable jury could find that Phelps was not actively resisting when he was tased, so the tasing violated the Fourth Amendment, and that right was clearly established by July 2020. The panel affirmed the denial of qualified immunity and remanded.
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
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Byrd v. Brishke
466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972)
The Seventh Circuit held that the trial judge used an improper standard. It also held that an officer, supervisory or not, who fails to stop other officers from summarily punishing a person in his presence or within his knowledge can be liable under § 1983. The directed verdicts for Moran, Pfeiffer and Finnin were reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial.
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Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee
751 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 2014)
Affirmed in part. The warrantless entry was justified under the emergency aid exception: the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to believe Sutterfield was in immediate danger and required emergency assistance. The court also addressed the ADA, rejecting the categorical *Hainze* rule and holding instead that ADA does apply to police conduct in mental health encounters, but that the required accommodations must be assessed against the circumstances—including the emergency—rather than by categorical rule.
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Yang v. Hardin
37 F.3d 282 (7th Cir. 1994)
The Seventh Circuit reversed. An officer who is present is liable under § 1983 if he had reason to know that excessive force, an unjustified arrest, or another constitutional violation was occurring and had a realistic opportunity to prevent it. Hardin was also liable for false imprisonment and assault. The case was remanded for a determination of damages against Hardin.
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
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Webb v. Hiykel
713 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1983)
The Eighth Circuit held that Officer Stanzel was liable under § 1983 for breaching his duty to intervene and prevent the excessive force he witnessed. The court vacated the judgment and remanded for a determination of damages against Stanzel.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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Blanford v. Sacramento County
406 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2005)
The Ninth Circuit held that all three volleys were objectively reasonable, and that even if they were not, no clearly established law would have put the deputies on notice that their conduct was unlawful. The court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants (Judge Noonan dissenting).
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Bryan v. MacPherson
630 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2010)
Viewing the facts in Bryan's favor, the Taser use was unconstitutionally excessive. However, because the law on tasers was not clearly established in 2005, MacPherson was entitled to qualified immunity, and the denial of summary judgment was reversed.
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Chew v. Gates
27 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1994)
The court reversed summary judgment for the City, because a jury must decide whether the force was excessive and caused by city policy. It affirmed qualified immunity for Gates, McKinley, Mooring and Yarnall, because the law on canine bite-and-hold policies was not clearly established. The case was remanded against the City only.
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Cunningham v. Gates
229 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 2000)
The court affirmed the denial of summary judgment for the shooting officers, police commissioners, and supervisors (except Captain Koenig), because factual disputes barred review. It reversed the denial for the non-shooting officers, the council members, the City attorneys, and Captain Koenig, and it found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to seek injunctive relief.
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Deorle v. Rutherford
272 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir. 2001)
The Ninth Circuit held that the force was excessive and that Rutherford was not entitled to qualified immunity, because "no reasonable officer could have concluded that the force employed was appropriate or lawful." The grant of summary judgment was reversed and the case remanded (Judge Silverman dissenting).
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Glenn v. Washington County
673 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2011)
Reversed and remanded for trial. Genuine disputes of material fact about whether both the beanbag force and the deadly force were reasonable precluded summary judgment. The court remanded the clearly-established prong of qualified immunity, the *Monell* claim, and the state wrongful-death claim.
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Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt
276 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2002)
On remand, the panel reaffirmed that Lewis and Philip are not entitled to qualified immunity because the pepper spray use was "plainly in excess of the force necessary under the circumstances, and no reasonable officer could have concluded otherwise." It reversed the grant of summary judgment for Lewis and Philip and remanded.
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LaLonde v. County of Riverside
204 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2000)
The Ninth Circuit reversed in all respects. The officers were not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law, and the illegal-entry, excessive-force, and *Monell* claims were remanded for a jury.
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Lolli v. County of Orange
351 F.3d 410 (9th Cir. 2003)
The court affirmed summary judgment for the County and the Sheriff and Assistant Sheriff. It reversed as to two sergeants and five deputies on the excessive-force claim, and as to one sergeant and the five deputies on the medical-needs claim, denying them qualified immunity at this stage. It also reinstated the state-law claims and remanded.
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Lowry v. City of San Diego
858 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
The en banc court held that the force was moderate, the City's interest was strong, and the force was not excessive. With no constitutional violation, the City could not be liable under *Monell*. Summary judgment for the City was affirmed.
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Mattos v. Agarano
661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)
Both plaintiffs alleged Fourth Amendment excessive-force violations, but the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because the law on tasers was not clearly established at the time. The court reversed the denials of qualified immunity on the § 1983 claims. In *Brooks*, it affirmed the denial of state-law immunity on the assault and battery claims.
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Miller v. Clark County
340 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2003)
The Ninth Circuit **affirmed**. The prolonged dog bite was not deadly force because it posed no more than a "remote possibility" of death. Under *Graham*, the use of the dog was reasonably necessary and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
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Nelson v. City of Davis
685 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2012)
The Ninth Circuit held that Nelson was seized, that the force was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and that a reasonable officer would have known it was unlawful "even when that force was applied in the larger context of crowd dispersal." The denial of qualified immunity was affirmed.
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Robins v. Meecham
60 F.3d 1436 (9th Cir. 1995)
The Ninth Circuit **affirmed** the denial of summary judgment and qualified immunity. It held that the Eighth Amendment requires force applied "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm," meaning *any* harm, and does not require intent aimed at the specific inmate who was injured. The non-shooting officers could be liable for failing to intervene.
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Sanderlin v. Dwyer
116 F.4th 905 (9th Cir. 2024)
Affirmed. Genuine disputes of material fact exist on both the First and Fourth Amendment claims. Under the law in effect on May 29, 2020, *Nelson v. City of Davis* clearly established that the shooting was a seizure, and *Nelson* and *Deorle* together clearly established that the force was unreasonable. Panighetti was denied qualified immunity.
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Ventura v. Rutledge
978 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2020)
The Ninth Circuit held that no clearly established law put Officer Rutledge on notice that her use of deadly force was unconstitutional, so she was entitled to qualified immunity. The grant of summary judgment was **affirmed**.
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Vos v. City of Newport Beach
892 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2018)
Reversed and remanded on both claims. Genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim. The ADA claim also survived because the district court had not adequately analyzed whether reasonable accommodation was feasible before the use of deadly force.
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Watkins v. City of Oakland
145 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1998)
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to Officer Chew and Chief Samuels, holding it was clearly established that "excessive duration of the bite and improper encouragement of a continuation of the attack by officers could constitute excessive force." It dismissed the City of Oakland's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
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Young v. County of Los Angeles
655 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2011)
Yes. Taking Young's facts as true, the force was excessive, and the governing principles were clearly established, so summary judgment and qualified immunity on the excessive force claim (and the related negligence claim) were reversed. Summary judgment on the false imprisonment claim was affirmed, because Wells's order to reenter the truck was lawful.
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Zion v. County of Orange
874 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2017)
The Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim (the second volley and the stomps) and on the familial-relations claim (the head stomps), and denied qualified immunity. It affirmed on the conceded *Monell* claims and remanded the remaining claims: **affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded**.
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
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Allen v. Muskogee
119 F.3d 837 (10th Cir. 1997)
A unanimous panel reversed summary judgment for the individual officers because disputed facts about their approach were material to reasonableness. A divided panel also reversed as to the City, holding that the evidence supported each element of failure-to-train liability under *City of Canton v. Harris*; the case was remanded.
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Estate of Ceballos v. Husk
919 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2019)
Yes. Denial of qualified immunity to Husk was affirmed, because *Allen v. Muskogee* (10th Cir. 1997) gave him fair notice. The court dismissed the City's failure-to-train appeal and Husk's state-law appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
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Estate of Larsen ex rel. Sturdivan v. Murr
511 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2008)
Murr's use of deadly force was objectively reasonable, so there was no Fourth Amendment violation. Without that underlying violation, the municipal and failure-to-train claims also failed. The court affirmed summary judgment for all defendants.
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Packard v. City & County of Denver
173 F.4th 1247 (10th Cir. 2026)
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the jury verdict on all grounds. The court held that it was clearly established no later than 2008 -- through *Fogarty v. City & County of Denver* and *Buck v. City & County of Denver* -- that officers violate the Fourth Amendment by deploying less-lethal munitions against peaceful, non-threatening protesters. Qualified immunity was therefore unavailable to Officer Christian. Denver's municipal liability was sustained on a failure-to-train theory: the city's failure to track officer munitions use and its inadequate training on crowd-control deployments constituted deliberate indifference to a known risk of constitutional violations. The joint trial challenge was rejected for lack of specificity.
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Pauly v. White
874 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2017)
The court held that, on the plaintiffs' facts, a jury could find White's shooting objectively unreasonable. But no case clearly established the violation, so White received qualified immunity. Because his conduct could not support liability and they committed no violation themselves, Mariscal and Truesdale were also entitled to judgment. The denial of summary judgment was reversed, with instructions to enter judgment for all three officers.
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
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Byrd v. Clark
783 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1986)
The Eleventh Circuit **reversed** the dismissal of the excessive-force claim against Officer Black and **remanded** for reinstatement. It **vacated** summary judgment for Officer Whitley so the district court could address failure-to-intervene liability. It **affirmed** in all other respects: the January 8 stop, the conspiracy claim, and the claims against Chief Solomon and the City.
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Garczynski v. Bradshaw
573 F.3d 1158 (11th Cir. 2009)
The Eleventh Circuit held that both the dynamic approach and the use of deadly force were objectively reasonable, so no constitutional violation occurred and the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Without an underlying violation, the deliberate-indifference claim against the Sheriff also failed. Affirmed.
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Long v. Slaton
508 F.3d 576 (11th Cir. 2007)
Reversed and remanded. The complaint failed to state a Fourth Amendment claim because the deadly force was objectively reasonable. In the alternative, the deputy and the sheriff were entitled to qualified immunity because no clearly established law gave fair warning that the conduct was unlawful.
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Nute v. White
No. 23-10273 (11th Cir. Sept. 16, 2025)
Yes. White was not entitled to qualified immunity, and the denial of summary judgment was affirmed. The court also held that a later phone call to a supervisor who was not in a position to intervene in time does not discharge the duty to intervene. Nute's cross-appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.