Mattos v. Agarano

Incident Summary & Facts

The en banc court consolidated two taser cases. Brooks v. City of Seattle (2004): Malaika Brooks, seven months pregnant, was stopped for driving 32 mph in a 20-mph school zone. She refused to sign the citation, and a sergeant ordered her arrested. She refused to get out of her car. Officer Jones displayed his taser. Brooks told officers she was pregnant, and the officers discussed where to tase her: “don’t do it in her stomach; do it in her thigh.” Officer Ornelas twisted her arm behind her back. Brooks stiffened and clutched the steering wheel. Ornelas removed the keys from the ignition, and they fell to the floor. Twenty-seven seconds after cycling the taser as a warning, Jones drive-stunned Brooks in the thigh. He stunned her again in the arm 36 seconds later and in the neck six seconds after that. She was then dragged from the car and handcuffed. She has permanent burn scars, and her baby was born healthy.

Mattos v. Agarano (2006): Maui officers responded at about 11 p.m. to a 911 domestic-dispute call that Jayzel Mattos had asked her daughter to make. Her husband Troy, 6‘3” and about 200 pounds, smelled of alcohol and became agitated and angry when an officer entered the home. When Officer Aikala announced Troy’s arrest, Jayzel was standing between the two men. Aikala pressed against her chest, and she “extended [her] arm to stop [her] breasts from being smashed against Aikala’s body.” She was asking everyone to calm down and go outside so her sleeping children would not wake. Aikala then fired his taser in dart mode “without warning.” All charges against the couple were later dropped.

Procedural posture: Interlocutory appeals from denials of qualified immunity, reheard en banc after two panels had reversed.

Core Legal Issue

Did the officers’ taser use against each woman amount to excessive force under the Fourth Amendment’s Graham balancing test? If so, was the unconstitutionality clearly established at the time (2004 and 2006)?

The Holding

Both plaintiffs alleged Fourth Amendment excessive-force violations, but the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because the law on tasers was not clearly established at the time. The court reversed the denials of qualified immunity on the § 1983 claims. In Brooks, it affirmed the denial of state-law immunity on the assault and battery claims.

The Court’s Analysis:

• Nature of force: Dart-mode tasers are “an intermediate, significant level of force.” The court did not decide what level of force drive-stun mode is, but noted that each drive-stun was “extremely painful.”
• Brooks under Graham: Her offenses were minor. Once the keys were out of the ignition, she posed no “potential threat,” let alone an “immediate threat,” and the court called threat “the most important single element.” Her resistance was nonviolent, and she did not try to flee. The court found two factors “overwhelmingly salient.” First, the officers knew she was pregnant. Second, she was tased three times in less than one minute, which left “no time for Brooks to recover … and reconsider her refusal to comply.”
• Mattos under Graham: Her offense was minimal, she posed no threat, and she resisted at most minimally. The court distinguished “a failure to facilitate an arrest” from “active resistance.” The danger of domestic calls is real, but it does not justify using intermediate force on “the non-threatening victim … whom they have come to protect.” Tasing her without warning “pushes this use of force far beyond the pale.” Citing Deorle, the court said a “desire to resolve quickly a potentially dangerous situation” does not justify such force.
• Clearly established law: In 2004 and 2006, no Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit decision addressed tasers. The three out-of-circuit cases on tasers had all rejected excessive-force claims. Under al-Kidd, Graham alone did not clearly establish the violation.
• Separate opinions: Judge Schroeder concurred, stressing that neither woman was threatening. Chief Judge Kozinski, partially dissenting, would have found no violation in either case. He described the taser as a safe tool “effective at a range of fifteen to thirty-five feet.” Judge Silverman, partially dissenting, would have denied immunity in Mattos because the force had to be proportional to the threat.