Zion v. County of Orange

Incident Summary & Facts

Connor Zion suffered several seizures and then had what the court called “a seemingly related episode” in which he bit his mother and cut her and his roommate with a kitchen knife. Police were called. When Deputy Juan Lopez got out of his patrol car at Zion’s apartment complex, Zion ran at him and stabbed him in the arms. Deputy Michael Higgins drove up separately and saw the attack.

Dashboard cameras on both cruisers recorded what followed. As Zion ran toward the apartment complex, Higgins fired at him from about fifteen feet away. Nine shots were fired and Zion fell to the ground. Higgins then ran to where Zion lay and fired nine more rounds at his body from about four feet, emptying his weapon. Zion curled up on his side. Higgins paused and walked in a circle while Zion was still moving. He then took a running start and stomped on Zion’s head three times. Zion died at the scene.

Zion’s mother sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Fourth Amendment excessive force and for Fourteenth Amendment loss of familial companionship, and also brought municipal-liability and state-law claims. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on every claim. The plaintiff did not challenge the first nine-round volley on appeal. She challenged only the second volley and the head stomps.

Core Legal Issue

Once a knife-armed suspect who has just attacked an officer is down and wounded, can a jury find that further deadly force (a second close-range volley and head stomps) was objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and that the head stomps “shock the conscience” under the Fourteenth Amendment? And was the law clearly established, which decides qualified immunity?

The Holding

The Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim (the second volley and the stomps) and on the familial-relations claim (the head stomps), and denied qualified immunity. It affirmed on the conceded Monell claims and remanded the remaining claims: affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

The Court’s Analysis:

• Immediate threat is the key Graham factor. The court noted that by the second volley Zion had been shot at nine times, was on the ground, appeared wounded, and was “making no threatening gestures.” Although Higgins “couldn’t be sure that Zion wasn’t bluffing,” Zion “was not in a position where he could easily harm anyone or flee.” A jury could find he was no longer an immediate threat. It could also find the second volley justified but not the head stomps.
• “Terminating a threat doesn’t necessarily mean terminating the suspect.” The court distinguished Plumhoff v. Rickard. A suspect on the ground who appears wounded may no longer pose a threat, and “a reasonable officer would reassess the situation rather than continue shooting.” The court said a jury could find Higgins could have protected himself and others by covering Zion with his gun and firing only if Zion tried to flee or attack.
• Self-serving testimony versus video. Higgins testified that Zion was trying to get up, but in the video Zion “shows no signs of getting up.” That created a factual dispute for a jury.
• Clearly established. Deadly force against a suspect who poses no threat (Tennessee v. Garner), and continued force against a suspect already on the ground (Drummond; Davis), were settled law. Qualified immunity was therefore denied.
• Fourteenth Amendment. The “purpose to harm” standard applied because there was no time for actual deliberation. The two volleys came “in rapid succession, without time for reflection” and so did not violate due process. The head stomps were different: Higgins walked in a circle for several seconds and took a running start before each stomp. A jury could find he was “acting out of anger or emotion rather than any legitimate law enforcement purpose.”