Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.

Incident Summary & Facts

In 1977, Lugar, who leased and operated a Virginia truckstop, owed money to his supplier, Edmondson Oil Co. Edmondson sued on the debt in state court. It also sought prejudgment attachment of Lugar’s property under a Virginia statute that required only an ex parte petition alleging a belief that the debtor was disposing of, or might dispose of, property to defeat creditors. A court clerk issued a writ of attachment, and the county sheriff executed it, sequestering Lugar’s property while leaving it in his possession. Thirty-four days after the levy, a state judge dismissed the attachment because Edmondson had failed to establish the statutory grounds. (Edmondson later obtained judgment on the debt itself.)

Lugar then sued Edmondson and its president under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that by attaching his property they had acted jointly with the State to deprive him of property without due process. The District Court dismissed for lack of state action under Flagg Brothers v. Brooks. The en banc Fourth Circuit affirmed on the different ground that a private litigant invoking presumptively valid state procedures, without collusion with officials, does not act “under color of state law.”

The case did not involve a use-of-force encounter. It concerns when a private party’s conduct can be attributed to the State under § 1983.

Core Legal Issue

Whether a private creditor who invokes a state prejudgment-attachment procedure that state officials then carry out acts “under color of state law” for purposes of § 1983, and how that statutory requirement relates to the Fourteenth Amendment’s “state action” requirement.

The Holding

Conduct that meets the Fourteenth Amendment’s state-action requirement also meets § 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement. A private party’s joint participation with state officials in seizing disputed property under a state-created attachment scheme makes that party a state actor. Lugar stated a § 1983 claim to the extent he challenged the constitutionality of the Virginia statute, but not to the extent he alleged only misuse or abuse of it. The Court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

The Court’s Analysis:

• Relying in part on United States v. Price, the Court held that the two requirements “cannot be so easily disentangled.” If challenged conduct is state action, it is also action under color of state law. Reading § 1983 more narrowly would undercut Congress’s purpose of creating a remedy “as broad as the protection that the Fourteenth Amendment affords.”
• The Court set out a two-part “fair attribution” test. First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of a right or privilege created by the State, or by a rule of conduct the State imposed. Second, the party charged must fairly be said to be a state actor, because he is a state official, “has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials,” or his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State.
• The count alleging that respondents’ conduct was “malicious” and “unlawful” under state law failed. Private misuse of a statute, contrary to state policy, “could in no way be attributed to a state rule or a state decision.”
• The count challenging the statute’s procedures succeeded. The procedural scheme is “the product of state action,” and invoking the aid of state officials to use state-created attachment procedures is sufficient “joint participation.” The Court said this holding “is limited to the particular context of prejudgment attachment.” It left open whether private parties may assert a good-faith defense.
• Dissents: Chief Justice Burger argued that merely invoking a presumptively valid procedure “available to all” is not fairly attributable to the State. Justice Powell, joined by Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor, called the decision “as unprecedented as it is unjust” to a private citizen who did no more than file a petition under a presumptively valid statute.