Monell v. Department of Social Services

Incident Summary & Facts

The petitioners were a class of female employees of New York City’s Department of Social Services and Board of Education. In July 1971 they sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Department and the Board, “as a matter of official policy,” forced pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before any medical reason required it. They sought injunctive relief and backpay. The defendants were the Department, the Board, the city of New York, and their officials, all sued only in their official capacities.

The district court held that the policy was unconstitutional under Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur. The requests for injunctive and declaratory relief were moot because the city had changed its policy. The court nonetheless denied backpay, because any award would ultimately come from the city, which was immune under Monroe v. Pape (1961). The Second Circuit affirmed. It held that the Board was not a “person” under § 1983 and that official-capacity damages claims could not proceed because the city would pay them.

The case did not involve a use-of-force encounter. It concerns whether, and on what basis, local governments can be sued under § 1983.

Core Legal Issue

Are local governments and their officials sued in their official capacities “persons” who can be sued under § 1983 and, if so, on what basis can a municipality be held liable for a constitutional violation?

The Holding

The Court overruled Monroe v. Pape “insofar as it holds that local governments are wholly immune from suit under § 1983.” Local governing bodies can be sued directly for damages, declaratory relief, or injunctive relief when an unconstitutional act “implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated,” or a governmental “custom.” Liability cannot rest on respondeat superior. The judgment was reversed.

The Court’s Analysis:

• Legislative history re-examined. Monroe had rested on Congress’s 1871 rejection of the Sherman amendment, which would have made municipalities liable for private riot damage. The Court concluded that opponents objected to Congress imposing a duty to keep the peace on municipalities, not to holding municipalities civilly liable for their own constitutional violations. Under the 1871 Dictionary Act and the case law of that era, “person” included “bodies politic and corporate.”
• Policy or custom is required. “[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor.” Section 1983’s “subjects, or causes to be subjected” language requires that the government itself cause the violation. Liability attaches “when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury,” with policy as “the moving force of the constitutional violation.”
• Custom counts. A municipality may be sued over a “custom” that has not received formal approval, if the practice is “so permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law.”
• No absolute immunity, and stare decisis did not bar overruling. Municipalities cannot claim absolute immunity, and the Court left qualified immunity open. Monroe was a departure from prior practice, was inconsistent with the school-board cases, and had not created legitimate reliance interests.
• Concurrences and dissent. Justice Powell concurred, calling this “the clear case” of formal written policy and noting that line-drawing problems remain. Justice Stevens joined only Parts I, III, and V. Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice, dissented on stare decisis grounds and would have adhered to Monroe.