Kingsley v. Hendrickson
576 U.S. 389 (2015)
- Status
- Current
- Version
- 1.0
- Date
- October 13, 2026
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
On this page
Incident Summary & Facts
Michael Kingsley was arrested on a drug charge and held before trial in a Wisconsin county jail. On the evening of May 20, 2010, an officer told him to remove a piece of paper covering the light fixture above his bed. Kingsley refused, and he refused again when other officers repeated the order. The next morning the jail administrator ordered him to remove it. When Kingsley again refused, he was told that officers would remove the paper and move him to a receiving cell in the meantime. Four officers, including Sergeant Stan Hendrickson and Deputy Fritz Degner, ordered Kingsley to stand, back up to the door, and keep his hands behind him. When he did not comply, they handcuffed him, carried him to a receiving cell, and placed him face down on a bunk with his hands cuffed behind his back.
The accounts then diverge. The officers said Kingsley resisted their efforts to remove the handcuffs, and Kingsley said he did not resist. All agree that Hendrickson put his knee in Kingsley’s back and that Kingsley told him, in impolite language, to get off. Kingsley testified that the two officers slammed his head into the concrete bunk, which they deny. It is undisputed that Hendrickson directed Degner to use a Taser, and Degner applied it to Kingsley’s back for about five seconds. The officers then left Kingsley handcuffed in the cell and returned 15 minutes later to remove the cuffs.
Kingsley sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The jury was instructed that Kingsley had to prove the officers “recklessly disregarded” his safety, and it found for the officers. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that a subjective inquiry into the officers’ state of mind was required.
Core Legal Issue
To prove a Fourteenth Amendment excessive-force claim, must a pretrial detainee show that officers were subjectively aware their force was unreasonable, or only that the force was objectively unreasonable?
The Holding
A pretrial detainee “must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” The jury instruction was erroneous. The Court vacated the judgment and remanded for the Seventh Circuit to decide whether the error was harmless.
The Court’s Analysis:
- Two state-of-mind questions. The first is whether the physical act was deliberate. It must be purposeful or knowing, possibly reckless, and accidental or negligent force (such as a Taser that “goes off by accident”) is not actionable. The second is whether the force was “excessive,” and that question is judged by an objective standard alone.
- The Graham perspective applies. Reasonableness is judged “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Courts must also defer to jail policies needed “to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.”
- Illustrative factors. These include the relationship between the need for force and the amount used; the extent of injury; any effort “to temper or to limit the amount of force”; the severity of the security problem; “the threat reasonably perceived by the officer”; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.
- Why an objective standard. The standard is consistent with Bell v. Wolfish, and the Court found it workable: many facilities already train officers to it. It also protects good-faith officers, because officers facing disturbances “are often forced to make split-second judgments.” Qualified immunity provides further protection. Pretrial detainees “cannot be punished at all,” so the Eighth Amendment’s “maliciously and sadistically” test does not apply to them.
- Dissents. Justice Scalia (joined by Roberts and Thomas) would require an intent to punish and warned against a “desire to tortify the Fourteenth Amendment.” Justice Alito would have dismissed the case as improvidently granted until the Court decides whether detainees may bring Fourth Amendment claims.