Mullenix v. Luna

Incident Summary & Facts

On March 23, 2010, a Tulia, Texas police sergeant tried to arrest Israel Leija, Jr. on a warrant at a drive-in restaurant. Leija sped off onto Interstate 27 and led officers on an 18-minute chase at 85 to 110 miles per hour, covering about 25 miles. Twice during the chase he called the police dispatcher, said he had a gun, and threatened to shoot officers if they did not stop pursuing him. The dispatcher relayed those threats, and a report that he might be intoxicated, to all officers. Officers set up tire spikes at three locations. Officer Troy Ducheneaux, trained to take a defensive position, manned the first set beneath the Cemetery Road overpass.

Texas DPS Trooper Chadrin Mullenix went to that overpass and decided to shoot at Leija’s car to disable it, a tactic he had never been trained in or tried. He asked the dispatcher to ask his supervisor whether it was “worth doing.” Viewing the facts in the plaintiffs’ favor, he heard the supervisor answer “stand by” and “see if the spikes work first.” Mullenix took a position with his service rifle on the overpass, 20 feet above the road, and discussed the plan with a deputy, who told him an officer was beneath the overpass. About three minutes later Leija’s car approached and Mullenix fired six shots. The car hit the spike strip, struck the median, and rolled two and a half times. Leija was killed by the shots; four hit his upper body and none hit the engine block.

Leija’s estate sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court denied Mullenix summary judgment on qualified immunity, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding no bystanders, relatively controlled driving, no chance given to the spike strips, and no “split-second judgment.” The Supreme Court granted certiorari and summarily reversed.

Core Legal Issue

Whether Mullenix was entitled to qualified immunity, that is, whether clearly established Fourth Amendment law prohibited using deadly force to stop a reportedly intoxicated fugitive in a high-speed chase who had threatened to shoot officers and was approaching an officer’s position.

The Holding

Addressing only qualified immunity, the Court held that existing precedent did not place the unreasonableness of Mullenix’s conduct “beyond debate,” so he was entitled to qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit’s judgment was reversed.

The Court’s Analysis:

• Courts must not define clearly established law “at a high level of generality.” The Fifth Circuit’s rule against deadly force on a fleeing felon “who does not pose a sufficient threat of harm” is nearly the same Garner-level formulation the Court rejected in Brosseau v. Haugen.
• Specificity is “especially important in the Fourth Amendment context,” because it is hard for an officer to know how excessive-force doctrine “will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.”
• Leija’s threat was at least as immediate as the one in Brosseau, and the Court has never found deadly force used in a dangerous car chase unconstitutional (Scott v. Harris, Plumhoff v. Rickard).
• Although “no weapon was ever seen,” police “were justified in taking Leija at his word” when he twice said he had a gun and would use it.
• Spike strips carry their own dangers and do not always work. No case denies immunity because officers “selected one dangerous alternative over another.” Qualified immunity protects actions in the “hazy border between excessive and acceptable force.”
• Concurrence (Scalia, J.): Shooting at the engine was not “deadly force” aimed at the person. Dissent (Sotomayor, J.): No governmental interest justified shooting rather than waiting for the spikes, which were less than a second away. Mullenix had minutes to consider and disregarded a “stand by” order.