Bryan v. MacPherson

Incident Summary & Facts

On July 24, 2005, Coronado Police Officer Brian MacPherson was enforcing seatbelt laws at an intersection when he stopped Carl Bryan, age 21, for not wearing his seatbelt. Bryan had already received a speeding ticket that morning, was upset with himself, and was wearing only boxer shorts and tennis shoes. He complied with requests to turn down his radio and pull to the curb, but hit his steering wheel and yelled expletives to himself. He then got out of the car and stood beside it, agitated, yelling gibberish and hitting his thighs. MacPherson testified he told Bryan to stay in the car; Bryan said he did not hear him. The officer had radioed for backup.

It was undisputed that Bryan made no verbal threats, did not try to flee, and, by the officer’s own account, stood twenty to twenty-five feet away. The officer said Bryan took “one step” toward him; Bryan denied it, and physical evidence suggested he was facing away. Without warning, MacPherson fired his Taser X26 in dart mode. A probe lodged in Bryan’s upper left arm, and he fell face-first onto the pavement, fracturing four teeth and suffering facial injuries. The probe had to be removed with a scalpel at a hospital.

Bryan sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court denied MacPherson qualified immunity at summary judgment, and he brought an interlocutory appeal. This amended opinion superseded an earlier one and was filed with an order denying rehearing en banc, a concurrence in that denial (Wardlaw, J.), and a dissent (Tallman, J., joined by Callahan and N.R. Smith, JJ.).

Core Legal Issue

Whether firing a Taser in dart mode at an unarmed, stationary, non-threatening misdemeanor suspect about 20 feet away was excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, and if so, whether that rule was clearly established in July 2005 so as to defeat qualified immunity.

The Holding

Viewing the facts in Bryan’s favor, the Taser use was unconstitutionally excessive. However, because the law on tasers was not clearly established in 2005, MacPherson was entitled to qualified immunity, and the denial of summary judgment was reversed.

The Court’s Analysis:

• Nature of the force: The X26 in dart mode, which delivers a 1200-volt charge that “instantly overrides the victim’s central nervous system,” is “an intermediate, significant level of force that must be justified by the governmental interest involved.” “Non-lethal” is “not synonymous with non-excessive.”
• Immediate threat (the “most important” Graham factor): Bryan was clearly unarmed (“there was nowhere for him to secrete any weapons”), made no threats, and was stationary 15 to 25 feet away and likely facing away. Even one step would have left him “roughly nineteen to twenty-four feet away.” “A simple statement by an officer that he fears for his safety . . . is not enough; there must be objective factors.”
• Severity of crime and resistance: A seatbelt infraction and nonviolent misdemeanors gave little justification. Failing to stay in the car was at most passive resistance. Possible mental illness weighed against significant force, not for it.
• Warning and alternatives: The officer gave no warning even though one was feasible, and backup was on the way. The court said officers need not use the “least intrusive” force but must consider feasible alternatives.
• Qualified immunity: No Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit decision had addressed taser dart mode as of 2005, so a reasonable officer could have made a reasonable mistake of law.
• Dissent from denial of rehearing en banc (Tallman, J.): A lone officer facing a “mostly naked man” acting with “irrational rage” could reasonably fear for his safety. The panel viewed the facts from Bryan’s perspective instead of the officer’s.