Kisela v. Hughes

Incident Summary & Facts

In May 2010, a neighbor called 911 in Tucson, Arizona, to report a woman hacking a tree with a kitchen knife. Officer Andrew Kisela and Officer Alex Garcia responded. The caller flagged them down, described the woman, and said she had been acting erratically. A third officer arrived by bicycle. The officers saw Sharon Chadwick standing by a car in a driveway, separated from them by a chain-link fence with a locked gate. Amy Hughes, who matched the description, then came out of the house carrying a large knife at her side, walked toward Chadwick, and stopped no more than six feet from her.

All three officers drew their guns and told Hughes at least twice to drop the knife. Viewing the record in Hughes’ favor, Chadwick said “take it easy,” and Hughes appeared calm but did not acknowledge the officers or drop the knife. Because the top bar of the fence blocked his line of fire, Kisela dropped to the ground and shot Hughes four times through the fence. Her injuries were not life-threatening. Less than a minute passed between the officers first seeing Chadwick and the shots. All three officers said they believed Hughes was a threat to Chadwick. Afterward they learned the two women were roommates and that Hughes had a history of mental illness. Chadwick said she never felt endangered.

Hughes sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court granted Kisela summary judgment; the Ninth Circuit reversed and denied rehearing en banc over a seven-judge dissent. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and summarily reversed.

Core Legal Issue

Whether Kisela was entitled to qualified immunity because shooting Hughes did not violate clearly established Fourth Amendment law at the time.

The Holding

Without deciding whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred (“a proposition that is not at all evident”), the Court held that Kisela was entitled to qualified immunity because no clearly established law prohibited his conduct. The Court reversed and remanded.

The Court’s Analysis:

• Applying Graham v. Connor, the Court repeated that reasonableness is judged from the perspective of the officer on the scene and must allow for “split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” Garner and Graham do not clearly establish law “outside an ‘obvious case.’”
• Officers are entitled to immunity unless existing precedent “squarely governs” the specific facts. Courts, “and the Ninth Circuit in particular,” must not define clearly established law “at a high level of generality.”
• This was “far from an obvious case.” Kisela “had mere seconds to assess the potential danger,” faced a woman just seen hacking a tree with a large kitchen knife, was separated by a fence, and saw her move within a few feet of Chadwick and fail to respond to loud commands to drop the knife.
• The most analogous circuit precedent, Blanford v. Sacramento County (deadly force upheld against an erratic man carrying a sword who refused commands to drop it), favored Kisela.
• Deorle (an unarmed, compliant man shot without warning after about 40 minutes of observation) was distinguishable. Glenn postdated the shooting, and the Ruby Ridge sniper case (Harris) did not apply.
• Dissent (Sotomayor, J., joined by Ginsburg, J.): Viewing the facts in Hughes’ favor, she was stationary, “composed and content,” held the knife down “with the blade facing away,” was suspected of no crime, may not have heard the commands, and received no warning. The two other officers held their fire.