City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik

Incident Summary & Facts

James Praprotnik, a licensed architect, joined the City of St. Louis in 1968 and by 1980 held a management-level planning position at the Community Development Agency (CDA), with strong evaluations and quick promotions. In April 1980, he was suspended for 15 days for taking outside work without prior approval under a requirement set by CDA Director Donald Spaid. The city’s Civil Service Commission reversed the suspension, awarded backpay, and ordered a reprimand instead. His supervisors were displeased, and his next two evaluations were markedly worse. He won partial relief on appeal each time. Justice Stevens’s dissent also relied on Praprotnik’s 1981 public testimony about a controversial Richard Serra sculpture, which displeased city officials.

In 1982, new CDA Director Frank Hamsher transferred Praprotnik to the Heritage and Urban Design Commission, where he was given mainly clerical work. The Civil Service Commission declined to hear his appeal because the transfer was “lateral.” In December 1983, he was laid off, officially for lack of funds. He sued the city and several supervisors under § 1983. A jury exonerated the individual defendants but found the city liable on First Amendment retaliation and due process theories, under an instruction (proposed by the city) that a municipality is liable for acts of “an official high enough in the government.” The Eighth Circuit vacated the due process verdict but affirmed on the First Amendment claim, treating officials whose decisions were not subject to de novo review as municipal “policymakers.”

The case did not involve a use-of-force encounter. It concerns municipal liability under § 1983 for personnel decisions.

Core Legal Issue

When can an isolated decision by a municipal official or employee expose the municipality itself to § 1983 liability? Specifically, who counts as a “final policymaker,” and is that a question of state law for the judge or a question of fact for the jury?

The Holding

The Eighth Circuit applied an incorrect legal standard. Identifying final policymakers is a question of state law, and a supervisor’s unreviewed discretionary decisions do not make that supervisor a municipal policymaker. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded. Justice O’Connor wrote the plurality opinion (four Justices), and Justice Brennan (three Justices) concurred in the judgment.

The Court’s Analysis:

• No respondeat superior. Under Monell, a city is liable only when its official policy or custom causes the violation, not merely because it employs a wrongdoer. The plurality noted that “an unjustified shooting by a police officer cannot, without more, be thought to result from official policy” (citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle).
• Pembaur principles. Only officials with “final policymaking authority” under state law can bind the city, and the act must be taken under a policy those officials adopted. Whether an official has that authority “is not a question of federal law, and it is not a question of fact in the usual sense,” and juries should not decide “which officials are high enough in the government.”
• Delegation and ratification. “Simply going along with discretionary decisions made by one’s subordinates . . . is not a delegation to them of the authority to make policy,” and “the mere failure to investigate the basis of a subordinate’s discretionary decisions does not amount to a delegation.” Liability can attach if policymakers ratify “a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it,” or if a widespread practice is “so permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage.’”
• Application. Under the City Charter, the Mayor and Aldermen and the Civil Service Commission, whose decisions are “final,” set personnel policy. Hamsher and Killen had discretion to transfer and lay off employees, but not authority to make city policy.
• Concurrence (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.): Agreed that Hamsher lacked policymaking authority over transfers. Criticized the plurality’s reliance on state statutory law alone, arguing that the factfinder should assess where authority “actually resides,” and warned of a “gaping hole” in § 1983.
• Dissent (Stevens, J.): The evidence showed top officials, possibly including the Mayor, retaliated against a whistleblower, and the city had invited the instruction it now challenged. He would have affirmed. Justice Kennedy took no part.