Estate of Larsen ex rel. Sturdivan v. Murr
511 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2008)
- Status
- Current
- Version
- 1.0
- Date
- October 13, 2026
- Court
- 10th Circuit Court of Appeals
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Incident Summary & Facts
After midnight on April 15, 2003, Lyle Larsen called 911 and threatened to “kill someone or himself.” Denver Officers Randy Murr and David Brase arrived in separate cars and approached the house on foot from different directions. Larsen stood alone on his front porch, which sat above the street behind a three-to-four-foot retaining wall, with a six-step concrete stairway, an iron railing and some shrubbery. He was holding a large knife with a blade over one foot long. Murr at first thought it was a pipe; Brase said it looked like “a small sword.” Both officers drew their pistols, and Brase identified himself and ordered Larsen to “put that knife down right now.”
Larsen bent over as if to set the knife down, then straightened up with it still in his hand. His eyes became “the size of quarters,” and he appeared agitated. He raised the knife above his shoulder with the blade pointed outward and turned toward Murr. Murr ordered him repeatedly to “drop the knife,” and a few seconds later warned, “Drop the knife or I’ll shoot.” Larsen turned and took a step toward Murr, who was on the sidewalk below. Murr fired twice and killed him. Brase held his fire but said he was moving into position to use force. Murr estimated the distance at 7 to 12 feet (elsewhere, 7 to 10 feet). On summary judgment the district court accepted the estate’s figure of 15 to 20 feet. No one else saw the shooting.
Procedural posture: The estate sued Murr for excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and sued Denver and its police chief over the city’s deadly-force policy and training. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants on qualified immunity and no constitutional violation. The estate appealed.
Core Legal Issue
Was Officer Murr’s use of deadly force against a man with a knife objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, given a disputed distance of 7 to 20 feet and physical barriers between them? And without a constitutional violation, could the city or police chief be liable?
The Holding
Murr’s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable, so there was no Fourth Amendment violation. Without that underlying violation, the municipal and failure-to-train claims also failed. The court affirmed summary judgment for all defendants.
The Court’s Analysis:
- Framework: Applying Graham v. Connor, the claim turned on whether Larsen posed an immediate threat. Deadly force is justified if a reasonable officer would have had probable cause to believe there was a threat of serious physical harm. That holds even if the officer was reasonably mistaken.
- Four threat factors: The court weighed (1) whether officers ordered the suspect to drop the weapon and whether he complied, (2) hostile motions with the weapon toward officers, (3) the distance between officer and suspect, and (4) the suspect’s manifest intentions. It listed eleven undisputed facts, including the threats in the 911 call, the late-night emergency, at least four ignored commands, Larsen’s high ground, the raised blade, and his step toward Murr.
- Distance is not a bright line: The court uses “no bright line rules” and “distance is but one factor of many.” It declined a per se rule under which distance alone creates a jury question. The disputed range did not change the outcome.
- Barriers cut both ways: The retaining wall and stairs supported a perception of threat as much as protection, because Larsen held the high ground. No reasonable officer would hold fire because the terrain “could either hinder or help an attack.”
- Precedents distinguished: In Zuchel and Walker, eyewitnesses disputed the threat itself. In Walker, the suspect held a two-inch blade to his own wrist, was more than 21 feet away, was not facing officers, and was given no warnings. Here Larsen made undisputed hostile movements.
- Municipal claims: Without a predicate constitutional violation, there can be no municipal liability (City of Los Angeles v. Heller) and no failure-to-train claim.