Anderson v. Creighton

Incident Summary & Facts

On November 11, 1983, FBI Agent Russell Anderson and other state and federal officers searched the Creighton family’s home without a warrant. Anderson believed that Vadaain Dixon, a suspect in a bank robbery committed earlier that day, might be there. He was not. The Creightons sued Anderson for damages under Bivens for a Fourth Amendment violation. Before any discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to Anderson, finding that he had probable cause and that exigent circumstances excused the lack of a warrant. The Eighth Circuit reversed. It held that factual disputes prevented summary judgment on the lawfulness of the search and that Anderson had no qualified immunity because the right to be free from warrantless home searches without probable cause and exigent circumstances was clearly established.

The majority did not describe the entry itself. Justice Stevens’s dissent quoted the Eighth Circuit’s account, taken in the light most favorable to the Creightons. According to that account, officers, many “brandishing shotguns,” came to the door at night. One officer told Mr. Creighton to “keep his hands in sight” while others rushed in, and an officer said “We don’t have a search warrant [and] don’t need [one].” A shotgun was pointed at Mrs. Creighton. In the garage, an officer punched Mr. Creighton in the face. Mr. Creighton said he was trying to move past the officer to open the garage door. The officer claimed Mr. Creighton tried to grab his shotgun. A ten-year-old daughter alleged she was hit and later roughly handled. Mr. Creighton was arrested for obstruction, jailed overnight, and released without charges.

These force allegations were background only. The question before the Court concerned the qualified-immunity standard for an allegedly unlawful warrantless search, not an excessive-force claim.

Core Legal Issue

Whether a federal law enforcement officer who takes part in a warrantless search that violates the Fourth Amendment may be held personally liable for damages if a reasonable officer could have believed the search was lawful. Put another way, at what level of specificity must the “clearly established” right be defined for qualified immunity?

The Holding

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed the search was lawful “in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed.” The Eighth Circuit erred by defining the right at too high a level of generality. The Court vacated the judgment and remanded.

The Court’s Analysis:

• Objective legal reasonableness (Harlow). Qualified immunity turns on the “objective legal reasonableness” of the action, judged against the rules “clearly established” at the time. It protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law” (quoting Malley v. Briggs).
• Level of generality. If rights were defined abstractly, plaintiffs could turn qualified immunity “into a rule of virtually unqualified liability.” Instead, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” This does not require that “the very action in question has previously been held unlawful,” but “in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.”
• Reasonable mistakes. Officers “will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present,” and the same is true of exigent circumstances. Such officers should not be personally liable. The inquiry is fact-specific but objective, and Anderson’s “subjective beliefs about the search are irrelevant.”
• No Fourth Amendment carve-out. The Court rejected the argument that one cannot “reasonably” act “unreasonably,” and it declined to create an exception for warrantless searches of innocent third parties’ homes for fugitives. It refused to “Balkanize” qualified immunity. On remand, immunity should be resolved early, with any discovery limited to the immunity question.
• Dissent (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.): The majority creates a “double standard of reasonableness” that “counts the law enforcement interest twice” and leaves an innocent family bearing the risk of a warrantless entry “equipped with force and arms.”