Carey v. Piphus

Incident Summary & Facts

This case involved two Chicago public school students suspended without procedural due process. On January 23, 1974, the principal of Chicago Vocational High School saw freshman Jarius Piphus and another student on school property passing what looked like an irregularly shaped cigarette. The principal smelled what he believed was burning marihuana, and the students threw the cigarette into a hedge. Piphus received the “usual” 20-day suspension for violating the school’s drug rule, despite his protest that he had not been smoking marihuana. Later meetings with his family explained the suspension but did not determine whether he was guilty. In the second case, on September 11, 1973, sixth-grader Silas Brisco refused to remove a small earring, which violated a principal’s rule against male students wearing earrings that the principal believed signaled gang membership. Brisco said it was a symbol of black pride. He received a 20-day suspension.

Both students sued school officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for suspension without due process. Piphus was readmitted after eight days and Brisco after seventeen. The district court held that both had been denied procedural due process and that the officials lacked qualified immunity. It awarded no damages, however, because the students offered no evidence quantifying any injury. The Seventh Circuit reversed. It held that the students could recover substantial “non-punitive” damages for the denial of due process itself, even if the suspensions were justified and no actual injury was shown.

The case did not involve a use-of-force encounter. It concerns what damages are available under § 1983.

Core Legal Issue

In a § 1983 action for deprivation of procedural due process, must a plaintiff prove actual injury caused by the deprivation in order to recover substantial compensatory damages, or may injury be presumed?

The Holding

Without proof of actual injury, plaintiffs denied procedural due process may recover only nominal damages “not to exceed one dollar.” Mental and emotional distress caused by the denial of due process is compensable, but it must be proved. The Court reversed and remanded.

The Court’s Analysis:

• Compensation principle. Section 1983 creates “a species of tort liability.” The basic purpose of a damages award is to compensate for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights. “Rights, constitutional and otherwise, do not exist in a vacuum.”
• Common-law tort rules as the starting point. Common-law damages rules are the “appropriate starting point,” adapted and “tailored to the interests protected by the particular right in question.” The elements of damages for one constitutional right “are not necessarily appropriate” for another.
• No presumed damages for procedural due process. The Court rejected an analogy to defamation per se. Not every procedural lapse is likely to cause distress. Distress may instead stem from a justified deprivation, which is not compensable. Distress can also be proved through ordinary evidence.
• Nominal damages vindicate “absolute” rights. Because procedural due process does not depend on the merits of the underlying claim and is important to “organized society,” its denial is actionable for nominal damages without proof of injury.
• Punitive damages and fees. The Court noted that punitive damages may be available in a proper case to deter or punish malicious violations, but the record supported none here. It also noted that attorney’s fees under § 1988 provide additional deterrence.