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Table of Authorities

Tolan v. Cotton

572 U.S. 650 (2014) (per curiam)

Status
Current
Version
1.0
Date
October 18, 2026
Court
United States Supreme Court
On this page

Incident Summary & Facts

Around 2:00 a.m. on December 31, 2008, Sergeant Jeffrey Cotton of the Bellaire, Texas Police Department ran the plates of a car parked in the driveway of a home and received a report indicating the plates might belong to a stolen vehicle (the report was erroneous—the car had been sold and the plates re-issued). Robert Tolan and his cousin, who had just returned home, were confronted by Cotton and ordered at gunpoint to lie on the ground. Robert’s father came outside to explain that his family owned the house; Cotton pushed the father against the garage door. Robert’s mother, Marian Tolan, then came outside. Cotton pushed her against the garage door as well. Robert rose from the ground. Cotton, testifying that he feared Marian was about to be attacked, shot Robert in the chest with his service pistol. Robert survived but suffered injuries affecting his ability to play professional baseball, for which he had been preparing.

The contested facts centered on the lighting of the porch. Cotton testified it was unlit and that he could not clearly see what Robert was doing. The Tolans presented evidence that a porch light was on and that Robert was simply pushing himself up from the ground, not lunging aggressively toward Cotton.

Procedural posture: The district court granted summary judgment for Cotton. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, drawing factual inferences in Cotton’s favor on the lighting and the nature of Robert’s movement. The Tolans petitioned for certiorari.

Did the Fifth Circuit properly apply the summary judgment standard by crediting the officer’s version of disputed material facts—the lighting on the porch and the nature of the plaintiff’s movement—rather than drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party?

The Holding

Reversed and remanded, per curiam (7–2; Alito and Scalia concurred only in the judgment). The Fifth Circuit failed to adhere to the foundational summary judgment rule requiring that courts view disputed facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. That failure was not harmless: the disputed facts were material to the excessive-force analysis.

The Court’s Analysis:

  • The summary judgment standard: “In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” The Fifth Circuit violated this standard by crediting Cotton’s account of the porch lighting over the Tolans’ contrary evidence.
  • Materiality of the disputed facts: The porch lighting and the nature of Robert’s movement were not peripheral—they bore directly on whether Cotton had an objectively reasonable fear that Marian was about to be attacked. A lit porch would have permitted Cotton to see clearly that Robert was merely rising from the ground.
  • Scott v. Harris distinguished: The Scott exception applies only where video or other evidence “blatantly contradicts” a party’s account. No such unambiguous evidence existed here. The mere existence of some evidence favoring the officer does not entitle the court to adopt the officer’s version of contested facts.
  • Second error—characterizing the movement: The Fifth Circuit described Robert’s movement as a “lunge toward” Cotton. The Tolans’ evidence did not support that characterization. The lower court substituted its own inference for the plaintiff’s version of events.
  • Concurrence (Alito, J., joined by Scalia, J.): Concurred in the judgment but emphasized that many of the facts in the majority’s account were disputed and that the per curiam should not have recited them as established; also expressed concern that the majority’s recitation itself improperly credited the plaintiff’s version of disputed facts.