

Qualified Immunity

Version 1.0 · Current · October 2026

What It Is

Qualified immunity is a judicially developed doctrine that can shield individual government officers from personal damages liability in federal civil-rights cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The modern rule has two requirements: the officer must have violated a federal constitutional right, and that right must have been clearly established at the time of the conduct. If either requirement is unmet, the officer is entitled to qualified immunity.

This creates two distinct legal inquiries that must be kept separate. *Graham v. Connor* asks whether the force violated the Fourth Amendment. Qualified immunity asks whether the officer may nonetheless avoid personal liability because existing law did not give sufficiently clear notice that this conduct, in these circumstances, was unlawful. A court can simultaneously hold that a constitutional violation occurred and that the officer receives qualified immunity – an outcome that does not mean the force was constitutional; it means only that the officer cannot be held personally liable for damages under the doctrine’s fair-notice framework.

The Clearly Established Requirement

The clearly established inquiry is not satisfied by general propositions. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that courts must not define the right at a high level of generality. Saying that force must be objectively reasonable, or that deadly force cannot be used without sufficient justification, does not by itself clearly establish whether a particular officer’s particular use of force in particular circumstances was unlawful. The inquiry must be particularized to the conduct and circumstances the officer actually confronted.

No prior case with identical facts is required – the Supreme Court expressly rejected that standard in *Hope v. Pelzer* (2002). But existing precedent must define the right with enough specificity that a reasonable officer would understand, from the state of the law at the time, that the conduct was unlawful. That is a demanding standard, especially in rapidly evolving Fourth Amendment encounters.

Timing matters. The law must have been clearly established when the officer acted, not when the case was decided. A circuit precedent issued after a 2017 shooting cannot supply fair notice for that 2017 conduct.

Jurisdiction matters. Clearly established law depends primarily on Supreme Court precedent and controlling circuit precedent. The same conduct may be clearly established in the Ninth Circuit while not clearly established in the Fifth, producing different immunity outcomes for identical tactics in different parts of the country.

The Obvious-Case Exception

A plaintiff does not always need a prior case with closely matching facts. *Hope v. Pelzer* and *Taylor v. Riojas* (2020) confirm that some constitutional violations are so obviously unlawful that no closely analogous precedent is required – a general principle provides adequate fair warning. This exception is real, but the Supreme Court uses it sparingly. The Court’s most frequent emphasis in force cases is on factual specificity; the obvious-case route is the exception, not the standard path.

Edged-Weapon Cases Specifically

Kisela v. Hughes (2018) is the most directly relevant Supreme Court decision for edged-weapon research. Police responded to a report of a woman behaving erratically with a knife; the officer shot Hughes as she stood near another woman while still holding the knife, had not complied with commands, and was within approximately six feet of the second person. The Ninth Circuit denied qualified immunity; the Supreme Court reversed. The Court granted immunity because existing precedent did not clearly establish that shooting was unconstitutional under that specific combination: knife visible and held, woman nearby, commands disregarded, encounter ongoing.

Kisela does not establish a general constitutional rule that shooting a knife-holding person is lawful. It established that, as of the incident date, no prior case had made the unlawfulness of that particular conduct clearly apparent. The distinction is significant for research: *Kisela* is a qualified-immunity ruling, not a finding of constitutional reasonableness.

Mullenix v. Luna (2015) reinforces the same point in a different context: a broad, accurate proposition – police cannot use deadly force against a fleeing felon who poses insufficient threat – was insufficient to clearly establish the unlawfulness of the specific tactic used. The clearly established inquiry focuses on “the violative nature of the *particular* conduct.”

The Sequencing Problem

Saucier v. Katz (2001) originally required courts to decide whether a constitutional violation occurred first, before addressing whether the right was clearly established. The rationale was doctrinal development: if courts always skipped the constitutional question and resolved cases only on immunity grounds, constitutional law would stagnate.

Pearson v. Callahan (2009) made that sequencing discretionary. Courts may now decide either prong first and grant immunity without ever deciding whether the officer’s conduct violated the Constitution.

The consequence: if courts repeatedly resolve novel force scenarios at the clearly-established prong without deciding the constitutional merits, constitutional law in those areas remains undeveloped. Future plaintiffs

then encounter the same problem – no clearly established precedent, because earlier courts declined to create any. This dynamic is relevant to emerging tactics and technologies where judicial precedent is thin.

Four Outcomes, Not Two

For research and litigation analysis, qualified-immunity cases produce four distinct outcomes that must not be conflated:

1. No constitutional violation – force was objectively reasonable; no liability possible.
2. Constitutional violation found, qualified immunity denied – officer is personally liable for damages.
3. Constitutional violation found or assumed, qualified immunity granted – violation occurred or was assumed to have occurred, but the law was not clearly established; no personal damages liability.
4. Constitutional question skipped, qualified immunity granted on clearly-established prong only – court never decided whether force was constitutional.

Treating outcomes 1, 3, and 4 as equivalent – labeling all as “officer prevailed” – systematically misrepresents the constitutional record. Outcome 3 can represent a finding that the force was unconstitutional, paired with a litigation result favorable to the officer. Outcome 4 may leave constitutional law undeveloped.

What Qualified Immunity Does Not Do

Qualified immunity does not:

- establish that the force was constitutionally reasonable
- establish that department policy was followed
- mean the officer acted in good faith or used best practices
- protect against criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 242
- prevent discipline or termination
- shield the municipality (municipalities do not receive qualified immunity)
- resolve whether Monell liability attaches to the agency

It determines only whether this individual officer can be held personally liable for federal damages given the state of the law at the time.

Policy Implications

1. Do not train officers to treat qualified immunity as a use-of-force standard. The operational question is whether force was lawful, necessary under applicable policy, and consistent with training – not

- whether the officer could later obtain immunity. An officer should not be making use-of-force decisions by asking whether prior case law is sufficiently specific.
2. A qualified-immunity win is not validation of the underlying tactics. When reviewing litigation outcomes, agencies should distinguish between cases holding the force was reasonable and cases in which force was unconstitutional but the officer received immunity because the law was unsettled. Those are different institutional accountability findings.
 3. Novel tactics and technologies carry qualified-immunity risk of a different kind. A lack of clearly established precedent may reduce personal damages exposure for the officer, but it also signals a policy gap – behavior that is not yet clearly prohibited is not therefore clearly appropriate. Agencies should not wait for constitutional litigation to generate the first detailed rule.
 4. Circuit law governs, not national training materials. Use-of-force training sourced from national organizations may not reflect controlling precedent in the relevant federal circuit. Agencies should monitor their own circuit’s published force decisions, not only Supreme Court rulings.
 5. Individual immunity does not resolve institutional liability. A qualified-immunity grant for an individual officer does not prevent a Monell claim against the municipality from proceeding on independent grounds. The two analyses run on separate tracks.

HOW TO CITE

Edged-Weapon Response Lab. (2026). *Qualified Immunity*. In *EWRL Evidence Library* (Version 1.0). https://droptheknife.org/bulletins/qualified_immunity (https://droptheknife.org/bulletins/qualified_immunity)